My 7 Thoughts On The Boko Haram Crisis, By Mukhtar Usman-Janguza

My 7 Thoughts On The Boko Haram Crisis, By Mukhtar Usman-Janguza

By Opinions | The Trent on October 25, 2014
Boko Haram Borno Sambisa Forest
File Photo: Nigerian Troops on alert

by Mukhtar Usman-Janguza

In this post, I outline four policies and three experimental concepts that I would implement if in an alternate universe I went to bed and woke up as Nigeria’s President and Commander-in-Chief.

State Organs and Institutions Put on a War Footing

Whether we choose to believe it or not, ours is a nation at war! Therefore, I will immediately put every organ of the State – i.e. the ministries, parastatals and State institutions – on a war footing. I will defend this radical move by explaining to my compatriots that we confront an ideologically committed foe whose immediate objective is to carve out an independent state on Nigerian soil. Despite recent tactical successes – particularly at Konduga where the military defeated several attempts by Boko Haram to retake the town – the overall strategic picture remains unchanged. The conflict is still in “fluid stalemate”. At the strategic level, the conflict is still characterised by stalemate – neither the Nigerian army nor Boko Haram is capable of comprehensively defeating the other for now. At the tactical level however, battlefield conditions remain highly fluid – limited offensives are still conducted, and population centers still change hands. An estimated 17 Local Government Areas straddling three states – Adamawa, Borno and Yobe – currently lie beyond the limits of State control. The map of Nigerian no longer reflects the realities on the ground. The constitutional implications of this fact are yet to be fully grasped. For example both Section 3 (6) of the Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) which declares that “there shall be 768 Local Government Areas”, and section 217 (2b) which emphasises territorial defence to be a cardinal duty of the armed forces, have been fundamentally breached.2. Call a Joint Session of the National AssemblyHaving put the State on a war footing, the next thing I would do is to call a Joint Session of Parliament. This war has gone on for five years now. The bedraggled terrorist band we once faced have now mutated into a formidable territorial organisation. Despite this, it is clear to me that most Nigerians are yet to fully comprehend the nature and magnitude of the threat confronting our Republic. Popular assessments of the conflict are often based on rumour, conspiracy theories – in many cases supplemented by fantastic lies from the government; the recent fiasco over a “ceasefire agreement” being a case in point. Our national leadership – the executive and the legislative – have simply abdicated their moral and constitutional responsibilities to provide united leadership on this existential issue. In momentous and turbulent times like these, it is the duty of the governing elite to step forward and provide focused leadership. Consequently, a joint session of parliament will provide me with a suitable platform to clearly define the nature of the problem confronting our nation, and to articulate with clarity what I intend to do to overcome this crisis.

Expand the Army

One of the first policies I will announce at the Joint Session is the expansion of the military, particularly the army. The Nigerian army is simply not large enough to defeat Boko Haram and conduct stability operations once the conventional conflict phase subsides. A simple example will suffice to illustrate the army’s comparatively small size given the task at hand. Sri-Lanka which recently won its 26 year-long civil war did so with an army of over 250,000 (as opposed to Nigeria’s army of about 80,000 – 100,000). And what is more, Borno alone is larger than the whole of Sri-Lanka by land area. I will therefore immediately set the Ministry of Defence the objective of generating implementable plans for a mass recruitment exercise, coupled with improved service conditions to entice graduates into joining. In the interim however, whilst plans for the mass recruitment and training are being worked out, I will insist on enforcing the principle of letting the police do their jobs – maintaining law and order, providing security during elections, manning checkpoints at vital locations, guarding sensitive locations etc. This will free soldiers from these duties so they can concentrate on their own Jobs­ – fighting and wining Nigeria’s war! Similarly, I will explore the legal and constitutional barriers to immediately stripping public officials of their excessively large security details; or at the very least, dramatically trimming these security details down to the absolute minimum required for the legitimate security needs of the official.

No public official will be exempt from this thorough exercise, not even the President. These excess security agents now gathered, bristling with their shiny weapons and often overly eager to harass civilians, will instead be encouraged to direct their martial energies towards the war effort in the northeast. These individuals will be presented with a simple option: They either immediately join the newly expanding army, with its improved salary package and service condition; or surrender their weapons and enter the vast unemployment market! It is an absolute scandal that whilst the conflict zone is crying out for extra troops, calmer parts of the country are overflowing with well-armed security operatives whose only job is to provide security to many of the individuals that contributed to wrecking the country in the first place!

Create an Executive “Committee of Six” for Controlling Information

The chaotic management of information has been one very worrying feature of how the Boko Haram crisis has been handled so far. Given the pivotal importance of information management in war, I will immediately set up an executive “Committee of Six” consisting of the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior, the National Security Adviser, the Director of the State Security Service, the Inspector General of Police, and the Minister of Information (as the chairman) to tightly control how State organs and institutions disseminate information about developments in the war. The operative word here is control; as opposed to distort or hide information. A tightly controlled and well executed information campaign will not only rebuild trust in the credibility of State institutions, but also shape perceptions of how developments are interpreted. I will clear out the dead woods now occupying the positions above, and instead replace them with men and women with the intellectual capacity to conceptualise and articulate a sophisticated strategic communication campaign.

Experimental Concepts

The three concepts I will outline below are underpinned by a single strategic aim: to “de-territorialize” Boko Haram. In other words, destroy its capacity to govern territories. As Boko Haram consolidates its hold on its territories, it will become more sophisticated in governance; and therefore more entrenched in its claimed “State”. There is also the confidence it will gain from having achieved the feat of claiming chunks of territories within Nigeria. This will make it much more difficult to dislodge. Slowing Boko Haram’s transition to stable governance, and ultimately reversing its territorial gains, is therefore an essential task that requires creative and bold solutions. The three concepts below are purely experimental which I will nevertheless hope to operationalise as soon as proper and extensive feasibility studies have been conducted.

Precision Airstrikes on “Symbols of Governance” (SoG) in captured areas

Ideally, Nigeria’s air force should be conducting intelligence-led daily air strikes on Boko Haram SoGs – e.g. its Shari’ah courts, “Emir’s” residence, Police/Hisbah stations, assembly points, and any other such strategic locations – with the aim of disrupting governance in Boko Haram controlled territories. Aside from its helicopters, which are vulnerable to Boko Haram’s anti-air weapons, Nigeria lacks precision airstrike capabilities to conduct such operations. Building such a capability will be a priority. This will be an opportunity for Nigeria’s diplomats to justify their salaries. I will fully expect them to take advantage of developments in the international arena – Russia’s and China’s increasing strategic assertiveness in international affairs – to open up new avenues for acquiring the weapons and training needed to modernize our military capabilities.

“Thunder Runs”

In April 2003 as US forces massed around Baghdad, they were faced with the prospect of a bloody urban operation to conquer Iraq’s capital city. In a bold gamble, armoured elements from the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, launched lightening thrusts deep into the city, driving along the main thoroughfares and major landmarks. The initial strategic aim was not to collapse the city’s defences after a few swift blows, but to test the city’s defences, and establish moral and psychological dominance over the defenders of the city in preparation for the coming struggle. So stunned were Baghdad’s defenders however that the entire city fell to US forces in just three days of fighting. Nigeria cannot obviously replicate this concept wholesale – given the qualitative difference in military capabilities – nor can it hope for a similar decisive strategic outcome – given the fact that Boko Haram’s operatives are far more ideologically committed to their cause that Saddam’s fighters ever where. But what Nigeria can do however is to conduct more limited “thunder runs” by armoured battalions against towns where Boko Haram presence is minimal. The strategic aim will be to integrate these with the precision airstrikes against Boko Haram SoGs so as to maintain constant pressure on Boko Haram fighters, particularly their conscripts who are more likely to occupy peripheral territories. Should such a limited, integrated, but high intensity, air-land operation be beyond the technical capacities of Nigerian forces, I will instruct the Ministry of Defence to immediately raise an experimental battalion and air squadron which, after sufficient training for a reasonable time period (about 6 months), form the nucleus of such a force. The aim will not be to immediately train the best of the best, but rather to create a reasonably effective force that can be operationally deployable within a relatively short time period. The experience of the conflict itself will hone and sharpen their technical capabilities.

Train Special Forces for Anti-Terrorist raids into Cameroon

Cameroon’s far north is Boko Haram’s strategic rear. Cameroon, with a small and weak army and with a collapsed state on its eastern border, lacks both the will and the capacity to reclaim its territory from Boko Haram. Under such circumstances, the principles of sovereignty will not restrain me from ordering anti-terrorist raids into Cameroon should national security demand it. I will therefore instruct the Ministry of Defence to work out modalities for training a brigade of Special Forces for anti-terrorist raids beyond Nigeria’s borders. I will instruct my Attorney General to prepare and submit a legal defence for such an audacious move. In doing so, I will advise him/her to study the precedent set by the US, where it recently started bombing targets in Syria after having “notified” but without seeking the consent of the government, for its applicability to Nigeria.

The justification offered by the US for its silent invasion of Pakistan’s territory during Operation Geronimo, which led to the killing of Osama Bin Laden could prove useful as well. While Nigeria of course lacks the power to break sovereignty norms with impunity, I am however confident that where there is a compelling national security imperative, and where objectives are clearly defined, limited, and well-articulated, the world will turn a blind eye to Cameroon’s protestations. I will instruct strategic planners at the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defence to undertake comprehensive assessments of the likely military, political and economic reactions from Cameroon, and how these can be offset.

Mukhtar Usman-Janguza: A London based Africa and Middle East public affairs commentator.  Follow him on Twitter @JanguzaArewa

Opninions expressed in this article are solely those of the author


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